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Abstract:
How does the aid system respond when insecurity and sud-
den forced displacement occur in what has long been con-
sidered a stable, development context? Can longer-term 
aid interventions adapt when challenged to “shift   gears” to 
address acute needs resulting from forced displacement? 
Based on observations from Médecins Sans Frontières pro-
jects in Haut-Uélé in northeastern DRC in 2008–2009, this 
article examines assistance to displaced populations and 
the residents hosting them in LRA-aff  ected areas—above 
all, the stakes and dilemmas in v ol v ed in r esponding to 
such a sudden-onset emergency in what international 
donors and the national government considered an area 
in development.
Initially, a much-needed response to violence and dis-
p l a c e m e n t  f a i l e d  t o  m a t e r i a l i z e ,  w i t h  l i t t l e  p e r m a n e n t  
humanitarian presence on the ground, while develop-
ment approaches failed to adapt and meet emergency 
needs. Short-term contingency support was provided 
through development NGOs, but with limited scope and 
maintaining cost-recovery schemes for health toward an 
impoverished population facing an increasingly precarious 
situation. A long-term development approach was simply 
unable to respond to the sudden population increase and a 
fragile health situation.
Résumé
Comment réagit le système d’aide lorsque l’insécurité 
et le déplacement forcé soudain se manifestent dans un 
contexte qui a longtemps été considéré comme stable et 
propice au développement? L’intervention humanitaire à 
long terme peut-elle s’adapter quand il lui faut « changer 
de vitesse » pour répondre aux besoins aigus résultant des 
déplacements forcés? S’appuyant sur l’étude de projets de 
Médecins Sans Frontières dans le Haut-Uélé, dans le nord-
est de la RDC en 2008–2009, cet article examine l’aide aux 
populations déplacées et aux résidents qui les accueillent 
en zones touchées par l’Armée de résistance du Seigneur 
(LRA), plus particulièrement les enjeux et dilemmes liés à 
la réaction envers une situation d’urgence apparue soudai-
nement dans une zone que les donateurs internationaux et 
le gouvernement national considéraient comme une zone 
de développement.
Au départ, une réponse fort nécessaire à la violence et 
au déplacement ne s’est pas concrétisée, avec une faible 
présence humanitaire permanente sur le terrain, alors 
que les approches de développement n’ont su s’adapter et 
répondre aux besoins d’urgence. Des ONG de développe-
ment ont apporté un soutien d’urgence à court terme mais 
de port ée l i m i t ée et le mai n tien d’ u n sy st ème de r ecou -
vrement des coûts pour les régimes de santé à l’intention 
d’une population appauvrie confronté à une situation de 
plus en plus précaire. Une approche de développement à 
long terme était tout simplement incapable de répondre à 
l’augmentation soudaine de la population et une situation 
de santé précaire.
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herever they occur, forced displacement and the 
urgent needs that result call for an immediate 
response. But how does the aid system respond 
when insecurity and forced displacement occur in what has 
long since been considered a stable, “development” context? 
Can longer-term aid interventions adapt when challenged 
to “shift   gears” to address acute needs resulting from sud-
den, forced displacement?
Much has been debated about how to defi  ne humani-
tarian and development approaches and how to transition 
between or link up emergency relief and development aid 
in response to crises. 1 Ideas of linking humanitarian and 
development paradigms and practices are based on several 
fundamental assumptions, including: the possibility for 
aid to treat the root causes of confl  ict or violence and/or 
to reinforce security; the nature of emergency as a tempor-
ary and transitory state; the desire to avoid “doing harm”2 
and/or creating aid dependency;3 and the ability to join 
up humanitarian, development, political, military, and/or 
other objectives without diminishing the eff  ectiveness and 
impact of each. Most of these assumptions have been sorely 
tested in recent years in an increasing number of protracted 
crises and fragile post-confl  ict settings—oft  en highlighting 
the necessity of distinction between coexisting humanitar-
ian and development approaches and challenging the idea 
of a linear continuum between relief and development.4
Indeed, the two approaches are divergent in their scope 
and aspirations. As a rule, humanitarian aid aims to meet 
urgent needs resulting from events that represent a rupture 
from normalcy, such as wars, violence, natural catastrophes, 
epidemics, and structural crises. Humanitarian aid adopts 
an immediate, politically unconditioned approach that facili-
tates the safe provision of assistance to those in need; it aspires 
to gain acceptance and security for its activities by main-
taining strict principles of impartiality and neutrality.5 By 
contrast, development approaches privilege ongoing, sustain-
able advances toward ending poverty and achieving human 
security. While humanitarian aid focuses on the immediate 
needs of populations, development aid rather emphasizes sup-
port to systems in the longer term. Th   is means that develop-
ment can align itself with wider political objectives, includ-
ing peace-building, state-building, and/or reinforcement 
of human rights and governance. In practice, the two para-
digms of humanitarianism and development are oft  en hardly 
absolutely distinct, with fi  eld-level situations oft  en ending up 
between emergency and development poles, with both para-
digms coexisting—depending on varying security, political, 
and economic conditions, as well as the functioning of basic 
services. At present, the tensions between the two approaches 
are thrown into even greater relief in an era when aid aspires 
to transition smoothly from crisis response to state-building, 
oft  en in volatile post-confl  ict settings.6 Accepting any rever-
sal of development gains and the resurgence of emergency 
needs defi  es the conventional logic of a linear transition from 
humanitarian to development response.
In health and humanitarian assistance, several key issues 
around humanitarian and development approaches recur 
regularly in practice.7 How to reconcile the two approaches 
and/or manage transition between the two approaches—
from humanitarian to development, but also development 
to emergency, if need be? What is the real practicability and 
eff  ectiveness of linking humanitarian and development and/
or adopting “early recovery” approaches? How to ensure an 
immediate response to urgent needs despite the oft  en pol-
itical demands for sustainability of longer term projects? 
In areas where humanitarian and development projects 
coexist, how to ensure respect of the operationally indis-
pensable humanitarian principles that guarantee security 
and access—while in exactly the same context, development 
aid may legitimately align with state structures or adopt 
political objectives?
Sudden forced displacement adds another challenge to 
these already classic discussions. Concerns about sustain-
a b ili ty  s u d d e nl y  c o m e  in t o  t e n s i o n  wi th  an  ur g e n t  n e e d  
for immediate assistance to cover the most basic needs of 
m o v i n g  p o p u l a t i o n s .  A i d  i s  c h a l l e n g e d  t o  “ s w i t c h  g e a r s ”  
from development to an emergency response—this has 
been exactly the case in Haut-Uélé in northeastern DRC in 
2008–2009.
Th   e remote and sparsely populated regions of Haut-Uélé 
and Bas-Uélé in Orientale Province have long been one of 
the most marginalized, if peaceful, areas in DRC, suff  ering 
from extremely fragile infrastructure and inadequate, oft  en 
non-existent basic services—with no permanent inter-
national aid presence on the ground. Starting in September 
2008, civilians in the Uélés were caught up in attacks by the 
Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
as well as in clashes between the LRA and the Congolese 
army and other regional armies.8 As the situation deterior-
ated, civilians also found themselves facing increasing ban-
ditry. Th   ousands of displaced people fl  ed to seek shelter and 
greater security in towns like Dungu, Doruma, Niangara, 
and Faradje that grew into ever more populous enclaves, 
with outlying villages and fi  elds empty and oft  en insecure.
With LRA presence throughout the larger region, vio-
lence and armed confrontations gradually expanded, 
impacting not only Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé in northeastern 
DRC, but also neighbouring areas of southern Sudan9 and 
eastern Central African Republic. Both internal displace-
ment and refugee fl  ows became widespread in an otherwise 
sparsely populated region. As of October 2010, the UN esti-
mated 2,000 people had been killed, over 2,600 abducted, 
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268,000 people remain displaced in northeastern DRC, over 
120,000 in Western Equatoria in southern Sudan, and 30,000 
in southeastern Central African Republic.10 From January 
to mid-March 2011, the UN reports 35 people killed, 104 
abducted, and over 17,000 displaced in LRA-aff  ected areas 
of Orientale Province. Since 2008, 20,000 Congolese have 
sought refugee in southern Sudan, while 3,500 have fl  ed to 
Central African Republic.11 By contrast to some refugees 
who have been housed in camps (e.g. Makpandu and Ezo 
in southern Sudan),12 most internally displaced fi  nd them-
selves seeking shelter with local populations and sharing 
already scarce resources in order to survive.
Since January 2009, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has 
intervened in response to the violence and displacement in 
the Uélés and currently runs medical humanitarian pro-
jects in Dingila, Doruma, Dungu, Duru, and Niangara. In 
these locations, MSF projects off  er primary and secondary 
health care free of charge, with a strong mobile outreach 
component wherever access allows (e.g. mobile clinics to 
the outlying areas of Nambia and Tapili from Niangara), 
or evacuations of wounded from Bangadi to Dungu by 
plane. Drawing on assessments in the region, interviews 
with international and Congolese health care providers and 
ongoing work within MSF projects in the fi  eld, this article 
examines assistance to displaced populations and the resi-
dents hosting them in LRA-aff  ected areas in northeastern 
DRC. Th   e case of Haut-Uélé provides insight into some of 
the key stakes and dilemmas involved in responding to such 
a sudden-onset emergency in what international donors 
and the national government considered an area in develop-
ment to date.
Th  e sudden violence, displacement, and urgent need in 
the Uélés challenged ongoing development in the region 
to adapt and “shift   gears”—to respond to immediate, oft  en 
life-saving needs; to negotiate between ongoing develop-
ment programming and emergency response; to build on 
years of lessons learned about assisting mixed populations 
of newly displaced and residents facing shared vulnerabil-
ity; to suspend conditioning of aid or concerns of sustain-
ability to provide timely and unconditional humanitarian 
assistance during a period which could last for the medium 
or even longer term. Considering a case of “shift  ing gears” 
as in Haut Uélé is paramount for aid practitioners and 
policy-makers facing ever more crises where humanitarian 
and development strategies coexist—and yet also aiming to 
meet the ambition to provide timely, eff  ective, and mean-
ingful aid for those in need.
At the onset of displacement in the Uélés, sparse develop-
ment funding was provided to this isolated and fragile 
region in the form of drug kits and fi  nancial incentives for 
medical staff   in selected health structures. Th   is support was 
already only partial, and provided without direct super-
vision. In some places, drug kits contained no fi  rst-line mal-
aria medication in an endemic region, yet did contain heart 
medication requiring diagnostic tests not available in local 
health centres. Staff   incentives were not complemented by 
any funding for maintenance of health structures them-
selves. In a cost recovery scheme, patients had long paid for 
the very basic health care accessible only at the few func-
tional facilities in the region.
Faced with an emergency displacement situation, year-
long development schemes already in these zones de santé 
found themselves struggling to keep up with more acute 
needs and spikes in consultations. In already fragile outlying 
health structures, staff   responded to the insecurity by fl  ee-
ing and/or reducing services even on the periphery of larger 
towns. One health centre outside a large town ended night 
service, in-patient care, and deliveries in December 2008 in 
order to avoid staff   and patient presence inside the structure 
and their resulting exposure to possible violence.
With the arrival of the LRA, the unexpected infl  ux of 
ID P s co nfr o n ted an alr eady sparse lan dsca pe o f dev el o p-
ment NGOs in the region. At the same time, due to insecur-
ity and inaccessibility of the area, few other humanitar-
ian organizations responded in the immediate aft  ermath. 
Absolutely no UN humanitarian funding was allotted for 
the emergency in Haut-Uélé until mid-year 2009.13 Even 
with increased attention to the Uélés, as of late 2009, there 
was a striking absence of NGOs permanently in the fi  eld 
outside the regional hub of Dungu.14 While both humani-
tarian and development donors did recognize the emer-
gency in late 2008, development actors expressed concern 
to MSF that an emergency intervention could “destabilize” 
ongoing development eff  orts. With an eye to the longer 
term development in course, donors responded with short-
term contingency programs of three to six months, oft  en 
specifi  cally targeting IDPs with free health care.
Yet in the situation of shared vulnerability for both IDPs 
and residents hosting them, local health care staff   were 
faced with the dilemma of imposing fees on some patients 
while off  ering others free care.15 Various national and inter-
national actors registered vastly diff  erent numbers of IDPs, 
causing diffi   culty in assessing needs and identifying IDPs, 
who in fact shared the same fragile living conditions as the 
host population. Short-term contingency plans caused prac-
tical confusion between free medications for IDPs under 
the emergency response, and for-charge medications under 
the prior long-term scheme. In the end, the overwhelm-
ing infl  ux of new, displaced patients led to key medications 
being out of stock and to an overall decline in ability to care 
for people in this precarious time.
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gears” played out in the Uélés at the time. In one key town, 
the local population in a territory of some 92,500 residents 
faced an infl  ux of 25,000 displaced people. Residents and 
IDPs shared all resources and consequently experienced 
a general decline in living conditions for all inhabitants 
together, along with the ongoing insecurity. At the outset of 
the emergency, the development NGO working in the zone 
received international funding for some 2.5 months from 
November 2008 to February 2009, to cover IDP needs with 
pre-positioned drug kits. Th   ese soon ran out, causing prob-
lems for personnel to explain to patients the reintroduction 
of fees for services and medications. Th  e town’s reference 
hospital off  ered no more than 850 consultations per month 
to pa ti en ts in la te 2008–early 2009 . Y et, as in terna ti o nal 
contingency support to the hospital ended in February, 
overall consultations dropped to fewer than 500 per month 
in March 2009.
In another key town aff  ected by the violence in late 
December 2008, 93,000 residents saw the displacement of 
some 22,000 people in the surroundings and an infl  ux of at 
least 5,000 people into the town by April 2009. Th  e  fi  rst dis-
tribution of food aid took place in early April 2009, but no 
household items were provided to the displaced nor were any 
provided to residents, 690 of whose houses had been burned. 
Th   e small local reference hospital and several health centres 
had been supported by development aid funding since 2000, 
providing medical care on a for-fee basis. Emergency fund-
ing for this location did not become available until April 
2009 and only lasted for six months, covering solely primary 
health care (without renovation or equipment of structures, 
e.g. with waste areas) and reimbursing consultation fees to 
pay staff   (but only based on the new patient caseload). Th  is 
funding provided for free medical care to all patients only 
in two key towns, based on their being “more aff  ected” by 
the insecurity, while in other towns in the region, only IDPs 
received free medical care. In the end, the combination of 
emergency and development funding covered all medical 
costs in some cases, but hardly represented a solution to 
widespread needs.
A related and similarly complex debate arose in the Uélés 
around the idea of “do no harm,” shared by both humanitar-
ian and development actors. Out of well-founded concerns 
that aid provided to displaced communities could make 
them a target for looting or attacks by various armed actors, 
UN forums at fi  eld level discussed criteria for stepping up 
assistance in mid-2009. Yet preconditions considered for 
the provision of aid included very political considerations 
entirely out of place in an emergency context: the attitude of 
the local authorities toward controlling and benefi  ting from 
aid, the discipline and material provision for the national 
army, FARDC, and the presence of IDP self-representation 
and registration. Due to the lack of international humani-
tarian aid, IDPs regularly travelled into insecure areas to 
recover food or other resources from their abandoned 
houses, villages, or fi  elds. In an informal survey done in 
two IDP sites in a large town in Haut Uélé in July 2009, 32 
per cent and 66 per cent in each site said they had gone back 
to their home communities to try to recover food or other 
items; by contrast, the overwhelming majority expressed no 
intention in returning to their homes on a permanent basis. 
Th   e upshot of this debate was that an ostensible concern for 
protection and longer-term sustainability of the overall aid 
intervention eff  ectively minimized an emergency interven-
tion, conditioning assistance on behaviour and governance 
by civil and military authorities. Th   e risks linked with dis-
tributing aid had eff  ectively been transferred to the IDPs 
themselves, who undertook the dangerous travel back to 
their abandoned homes to cope when international assist-
ance failed to arrive.
At the same time, ironically, there was an overwhelming 
absence of (inter)national actors working on protection, in 
particular working on sexual violence and child protection, 
key issues oft  en cited in connection with the LRA context. 
Th   e initially meager physical presence of humanitarians in 
the fi  eld, while providing some (material) support to the 
population, remained hampered by insecurity and was 
hardly enough to ensure protection, much less to provide 
for even basic needs.16
Today, in the Uélés, widespread insecurity persists, giving 
IDPs little chance to return to outlying villages and fi  elds. 
Perceived as safer, towns have attracted ever more displaced 
people seeking security and evolved ever more into enclaves. 
As of mid-year 2010, the population had surged in towns 
like Niangara, which doubled to 40,000 inhabitants due to 
the infl  ux of displaced people. Th  e situation in Niangara 
and throughout the Uélés poses the question of how assist-
ance will continue in future—with continued insecurity, 
the lack of an immediate solution for the displaced, and the 
precarious situation shared by both residents and IDPs who 
depend on a handful of emergency aid actors for their most 
basic needs.
Response to displacement in the Uélés raises several key 
issues. To what extent is it acceptable to delay or limit emer-
gency response because a region of forced displacement has 
long been characterized as being in “development”? How 
long can an emergency response depend solely on ad hoc 
approaches and contingency plans in the short term, while 
still holding onto the idea of preserving the sustainability of 
long-term programs? To what extent can long-term inten-
tions ever legitimately take precedence over short-term, life-
saving responses to urgent humanitarian needs? Keeping in 
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in the region, can “targeting” IDPs in mixed populations 
ever be acceptable in a humanitarian response to forced dis-
placement, where displaced share the living conditions of 
host families?
In Haut-Uélé, ad hoc contingency responses were 
advanced to address a sudden-onset emergency in the inter-
est of maintaining ongoing development work. Th  e  upshot 
of this approach included delays and gaps in assistance as 
well as inaccessible and oft  en inadequate medical care in an 
emergency situation. Faced with large-scale violence and 
displacement with probable longer-term impact, such an 
approach risks reaching neither humanitarian nor develop-
ment objectives—neither meeting urgent needs nor assur-
ing access to health care for an entire community facing 
heightened and shared vulnerability. Forced displacement 
and violence may reverse desirable development gains, but 
the broader policy and oft  en political goal of ensuring their 
sustainability cannot come at the very real cost of neglecting 
a life-saving response.
For the fi  rst year aft  er the arrival of the LRA, aid in the 
Uélés remained absolutely inadequate in response to the 
needs of this mixed population of newly displaced and 
residents facing shared vulnerability and widespread vio-
l e n ce.  A  m u ch - n eed ed,  tim e l y  h um ani tarian  r es po nse  t o  
vi o l e n c e  an d  di s p l a c e m e n t  f ail e d  t o  m a t e ri alize,  wi th  an  
almost absolute lack of permanent humanitarian presence 
on the ground, as well as political conditioning of urgent 
emergency assistance on questions of governance and pro-
tection. At the same time, development approaches failed 
to adapt and meet emergency needs. So as not to disturb 
long-term eff  orts, short-term contingency support was pro-
vided through development NGOs, but with limited scope 
in time and place and maintaining cost-recovery schemes 
for health toward an already impoverished population 
facing an increasingly precarious situation. A development 
approach focused on the long term was simply unable to 
respond to the sudden increase in population and to their 
ever more fragile health situation.
Th  e Uélés are hardly an isolated case of the challenges 
of responding to displacement in “development” zones of 
DRC—similar dilemmas have also arisen recently around 
displacement in Equateur. Drawing on fi  eld-based experi-
ence, this article aims to feed debates on humanitarian and 
development paradigms by showing how the concrete and 
complex dilemmas for practitioners translate into a very 
real impact on the lives and health of populations. Similar 
scenarios occur in many other contexts worldwide where 
sudden-onset emergencies, violence, and displacement 
are likely to arise alongside extensive “development” work 
and challenge the paradigm of a linear transition or easy 
coexistence of humanitarian and development aid—from 
Afghanistan to Haiti, southern Sudan, and Ivory Coast. 
Th  e aid system’s response to emergency needs arising in 
“development” contexts deserves further study and elabora-
tion to ensure the most relevant and eff  ective assistance pos-
sible in response to urgent humanitarian needs. Th  e  many 
barriers to emergency response in “development” settings 
merit further, concrete analysis as to how they actually play 
out in the fi  eld. Th   ese include the frequent absence of imple-
menting actors and/or limited funding instruments in such 
sudden-onset emergencies; tensions around sustainabil-
ity—in particular between emergency response and wider 
support to (health) systems; questions around the degree 
of aid alignment with states that may be absent, fragile, or 
belligerents per se; and wider divergences in philosophies 
of intervention (e.g. cost recovery, “do no harm”)—just to 
name a few. Cases such as Haut Uélé should provoke fur-
ther debate about the continually evolving coexistence of 
humanitarian and development strategies, as well as about 
divergent assistance to refugees, IDPs, and host population, 
particularly in open settings17 where vulnerable popula-
tions are frequently forced to share already-scarce resources 
and services.
While the long-debated tensions between emergency 
and development approaches will never be fully resolved, 
the presence of development aid simply cannot and should 
not justify the failure of a timely and meaningful response 
to emergency humanitarian needs. Th  ose working on vio-
lence and forced migration are challenged to remain vigi-
lant to ensure that longer-term concerns do not hinder the 
response of “shift  ing gears” to meet the immediate needs of 
displaced people.
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